Operation Barbarossa

Operation Barbarossa was the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany and several of its European Axis allies starting on Sunday, 22 June 1941, during World War II. More than 3.8 million Axis troops invaded the western Soviet Union along a 2,900-kilometer (1,800 mi) front, with the main goal of capturing territory up to a line between Arkhangelsk and Astrakhan, known as the A–A line. The attack became the largest and costliest military offensive in human history, with around 10 million combatants taking part in the opening phase and over 8 million casualties by the end of the operation on 5 December 1941. It marked a major escalation of World War II, opened the Eastern Front—the largest and deadliest land war in history—and brought the Soviet Union into the Allied powers. The operation, code-named after the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa ("red beard"), put into action Nazi Germany's ideological goals of eradicating communism and conquering the western Soviet Union to repopulate it with Germans under Generalplan Ost, which planned for the removal of the native Slavic peoples by mass deportation to Siberia, Germanisation, enslavement, and genocide. The material targets of the invasion were the agricultural and mineral resources of territories such as Ukraine and Byelorussia and oil fields in the Caucasus. The Axis eventually captured five million Soviet Red Army troops on the Eastern Front and deliberately starved to death or otherwise killed 3.3 million prisoners of war, as well as millions of civilians. Mass shootings and gassing operations, carried out by German paramilitary death squads and collaborators, murdered over a million Soviet Jews as part of the Holocaust. In the two years leading up to the invasion, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed political and economic pacts for strategic purposes. Following the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in July 1940, the German High Command began planning an invasion of the country, which was approved by Adolf Hitler in December. In early 1941, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, despite receiving intelligence about an imminent attack, did not order a mobilization of the Red Army, fearing that it might provoke Germany. As a result, Soviet forces were largely caught unprepared when the invasion began, with many units positioned poorly and understrength. The invasion began on 22 June 1941 with a massive ground and air assault. The main part of Army Group South invaded from occupied Poland on 22 June, and on 2 July was joined by a combination of German and Romanian forces attacking from Romania. Kiev was captured on 19 September, which was followed by the captures of Kharkov on 24 October and Rostov-on-Don on 20 November, by which time most of Crimea had been captured and Sevastopol put under siege. Army Group North overran the Baltic lands, and on 8 September 1941 began a siege of Leningrad with Finnish forces that ultimately lasted until 1944. Army Group Centre, the strongest of the three groups, captured Smolensk in late July 1941 before beginning a drive on Moscow on 2 October. Facing logistical problems with supply, slowed by muddy terrain, not fully outfitted for Russia's brutal winter, and coping with determined Soviet resistance, Army Group Centre's offensive stalled at the city's outskirts by 5 December, at which point the Soviets began a major counteroffensive.

The failure of Operation Barbarossa reversed the fortunes of Nazi Germany. Operationally, it achieved significant victories and occupied some of the most important economic regions of the Soviet Union, captured millions of prisoners, and inflicted heavy casualties. The German high command anticipated a quick collapse of resistance as in the invasion of Poland, but instead the Red Army absorbed the German Wehrmacht's strongest blows and bogged it down in a war of attrition for which Germany was unprepared. Following the heavy losses and logistical strain of Barbarossa, German forces could no longer attack along the entire front, and their subsequent operations—such as Case Blue in 1942 and Operation Citadel in 1943—ultimately failed.

Infobox

Date

22 June – 5 December 1941(5 months and 13 days)

Location

Western Soviet Union

Result

Axis strategic failure

Territorialchanges

Axis captured approximately 600,000 sq mi (1,600,000 km2) of Soviet territory but failed to reach the A–A line

Tables

Administrative subdivisions of conquered Soviet territory as envisaged, and then partially realised, by Alfred Rosenberg[99][100] · Background › Axis invasion plans

Reichskommissariat Ostland

Name

Reichskommissariat Ostland

Note

Baltic countries and Belarus

Map

Reichskommissariat Ukraine

Name

Reichskommissariat Ukraine

Note

Ukraine, enlarged eastwards to the Volga

Map

Reichskommissariat Kaukasien

Name

Reichskommissariat Kaukasien

Note

Southern Russia and the Caucasus region

Map

Unrealised

Reichskommissariat Moskowien

Name

Reichskommissariat Moskowien

Note

Moscow metropolitan area and remaining European Russia; originally called Reichskommissariat Russland, later renamed

Map

Unrealised

Reichskommissariat Turkestan

Name

Reichskommissariat Turkestan

Note

Central Asian republics and territories

Map

Unrealised

Name	Note	Map
Reichskommissariat Ostland	Baltic countries and Belarus
Reichskommissariat Ukraine	Ukraine, enlarged eastwards to the Volga
Reichskommissariat Kaukasien	Southern Russia and the Caucasus region	Unrealised
Reichskommissariat Moskowien	Moscow metropolitan area and remaining European Russia; originally called Reichskommissariat Russland, later renamed	Unrealised
Reichskommissariat Turkestan	Central Asian republics and territories	Unrealised

Development of the Soviet Armed Forces[178] · Soviet preparations

Divisions calculated

Col 1

Divisions calculated

1 January 1939

131.5

22 June 1941

316.5

Increase

140.7%

Personnel

Col 1

Personnel

1 January 1939

2,485,000

22 June 1941

5,774,000

Increase

132.4%

Guns and mortars

Col 1

Guns and mortars

1 January 1939

55,800

22 June 1941

117,600

Increase

110.7%

Tanks

Col 1

Tanks

1 January 1939

21,100

22 June 1941

25,700

Increase

21.8%

Aircraft

Col 1

Aircraft

1 January 1939

7,700

22 June 1941

18,700

Increase

142.8%

	1 January 1939	22 June 1941	Increase
Divisions calculated	131.5	316.5	140.7%
Personnel	2,485,000	5,774,000	132.4%
Guns and mortars	55,800	117,600	110.7%
Tanks	21,100	25,700	21.8%
Aircraft	7,700	18,700	142.8%

Order of battle – June 1941[189][190][191][192] · Order of battle

mw- .mw- .mw- .mw- .mw-parser-output .treeview li Northern Theatre Army of Norway Finnish Army of Karelia Army Group North 18th Army Panzer Group 4 16th Army Luftflotte 1 Army Group Centre Panzer Group 3 9th Army 4th Army Panzer Group 2 Luftflotte 2 Army Group South 6th Army Panzer Group 1 17th Army Slovak Expeditionary Army Group Royal Hungarian Army Mobile Corps 11th Army Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia Romanian 3rd Army Romanian 4th Army Luftflotte 4

Axis forces

Soviet forces

Northern Front 7th Army 14th Army 23rd Army 10th Mechanised Corps 1st Mechanised Corps Northern PVO North-Western Front 27th Army 8th Army 12th Mechanised Corps 11th Army 3rd Mechanised Corps 5th Airborne Corps Baltic VVS Northern Fleet Baltic Fleet Western Front 3rd Army 11th Mechanised Corps 10th Army 6th Mechanised Corps 13th Mechanised Corps 4th Army 14th Mechanised Corps 13th Army 17th and 20th Mechanised Corps 2nd Rifle, 21st Rifle, 44th Rifle, 47th Rifle, 50th Rifle and 4th Airborne Corps Western VVS South-Western Front 5th Army 9th Mechanised Corps 22nd Mechanised Corps 6th Army 4th Mechanised Corps 15th Mechanised Corps 26th Army 8th Mechanised Corps 12th Army 16th Mechanised Corps 31 Rifle, 36th Rifle, 49th Rifle, 55th Rifle and 1st Airborne Corps Kiev VVS Southern Front 9th Independent Army 2nd Mechanised Corps 18th Mechanised Corps 7th Rifle, 9th Rifle and 3rd Airborne Corps Odessa VVS Black Sea Fleet Stavka Reserve Armies (second strategic echelon) 16th Army 5th Mechanised Corps 19th Army 26th Mechanised Corps 20th Army 7th Mechanised Corps 21st Army 25th Mechanised Corps 22nd Army 24th Army 20th Rifle, 45th Rifle, 67th Rifle and 21st Mechanised Corps.

Total number of divisions (22 June)

Axis forces

Total number of divisions (22 June)

German: 152 Romanian: 14

Axis forces

German: 152 Romanian: 14

Soviet forces

Soviet: 220

Axis forces	Soviet forces
mw- .mw- treeview li Northern Theatre Army of Norway Finnish Army of Karelia Army Group North 18th Army Panzer Group 4 16th Army Luftflotte 1 Army Group Centre Panzer Group 3 9th Army 4th Army Panzer Group 2 Luftflotte 2 Army Group South 6th Army Panzer Group 1 17th Army Slovak Expeditionary Army Group Royal Hungarian Army Mobile Corps 11th Army Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia Romanian 3rd Army Romanian 4th Army Luftflotte 4	Northern Front 7th Army 14th Army 23rd Army 10th Mechanised Corps 1st Mechanised Corps Northern PVO North-Western Front 27th Army 8th Army 12th Mechanised Corps 11th Army 3rd Mechanised Corps 5th Airborne Corps Baltic VVS Northern Fleet Baltic Fleet Western Front 3rd Army 11th Mechanised Corps 10th Army 6th Mechanised Corps 13th Mechanised Corps 4th Army 14th Mechanised Corps 13th Army 17th and 20th Mechanised Corps 2nd Rifle, 21st Rifle, 44th Rifle, 47th Rifle, 50th Rifle and 4th Airborne Corps Western VVS South-Western Front 5th Army 9th Mechanised Corps 22nd Mechanised Corps 6th Army 4th Mechanised Corps 15th Mechanised Corps 26th Army 8th Mechanised Corps 12th Army 16th Mechanised Corps 31 Rifle, 36th Rifle, 49th Rifle, 55th Rifle and 1st Airborne Corps Kiev VVS Southern Front 9th Independent Army 2nd Mechanised Corps 18th Mechanised Corps 7th Rifle, 9th Rifle and 3rd Airborne Corps Odessa VVS Black Sea Fleet Stavka Reserve Armies (second strategic echelon) 16th Army 5th Mechanised Corps 19th Army 26th Mechanised Corps 20th Army 7th Mechanised Corps 21st Army 25th Mechanised Corps 22nd Army 24th Army 20th Rifle, 45th Rifle, 67th Rifle and 21st Mechanised Corps.
Total number of divisions (22 June)
German: 152 Romanian: 14	Soviet: 220

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Germany's allies, in total, provided a significant number of troops and material to the front. There were also numerous
The Light Transport Brigade from Croatia was attached to the 3rd Cavalry Division "Principe Amedeo Duca d'Aosta"
Of the AFVs, Askey reports there were 301 assault guns, 257 tank destroyers and self-propelled guns, 1,055 armoured half
881,788 of which are German
Excludes an additional 395,799 who were deemed unfit for service due to non-combat causes, transported out of their Army
855 killed, 2,288 wounded in action, 277 missing and captured, 1,000 sick and injured
German: Unternehmen Barbarossa; Russian: Опера́ция Барбаро́сса, romanized: Operatsiya Barbarossa
See for instance the involvement of Latvian and Ukrainian forces in killing Jews cited by historian Raul Hilberg.
It is additionally important that considerable portions of the German General Staff thought of Russia as a "colossus of
During the war between the Soviet Union and Finland, 87,507 Soviet troops were killed, another 39,369 were missing-in-ac
This systematic plan was developed by officials within the Reich Ministry of Food, the Wehrwirtschaftsamt, and the Wehrm
Concerning this strategic mistake, historian David Stone asserts that, "If Hitler's decision to invade Russia in 1941 wa
Flooding was so bad that Guderian wrote: "The Balkans Campaign had been concluded with all the speed desired, and the tr
Guderian wrote: "A delay was almost certainly inevitable given that the late spring thaw had swelled and in some cases f
For the Finnish President, Risto Ryti, the attack against the Soviet Union was part of the struggle against Bolshevism a
By the summer of 1941, formations of the Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS, comprising Waffen-SS brigades, were deployed alon
The four Soviet military districts facing the Axis, the Baltic Military District, the Western Special Military District,
Historian Victor Davis Hanson reports that before the war came to its conclusion, the Soviets had an artillery advantage
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